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NOTE FOR: Mr. Banner [redacted] through Mr. [redacted] and Mr. [redacted]

LEO

SUBJECT : TET Offensive

1. Reports have been received from the Offices of Personnel, Security, Communications, and Logistics. The Offices of Training and Medical Services submitted negative reports; the Office of Finance has not responded.

Office of Personnel

Reports no unusual activity on the part of their personnel who did, however, share in the general effort during the emergency in Saigon.

Office of Security

Submitted two separate reports, the first consisting of a copy of the monthly report, covering the period 31 January - 29 February 1968, detailing the activity of the Saigon Security Office. I have underlined in red items which may be of interest to you. The second report consists of comments by [redacted] who comprised a security team on TDY in Vietnam at the time of the TET Offensive. These comments are quite general and refer to no specific outstanding acts.

Office of Communications

Refers again to [redacted]
[redacted] It also notes that a request for emergency voice equipment was met in a matter of days by the preparation, [redacted]
[redacted] OC also points out two lessons learned: the need for diversified and dispersed repair facilities, and the maintenance of a larger reserve of spare equipment in Saigon. The report points out the generally outstanding job performed by Communications personnel under very difficult conditions.

Office of Logistics

This report details in attachments the emergency support action that was taken [redacted] in answering urgent requests for ordnance items, rations, batteries, fragmentation vests, etc. A section is also included covering additional action taken within CONUS in response to emergency requests.

2. The reports, as noted above, are attached for your review.

RI/CDF Pages 28, 29, 32, 33, 36 & 37.

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downgrading and
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25 June 1968


MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Office of Medical Services -- TET Offensive

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 OMS has nothing of interest to
report on activities of medical personnel during the 30 January -
15 February Viet Cong offensive.

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Special Assistant to the
Deputy Director for Support

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1 - DD/S Chrono

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DD/S 68-2542

17 MAY 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[REDACTED]

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Special Assistant to the DD/S

SUBJECT : Actions Undertaken During Tet Offensive in
Vietnam -- 30 January to 15 February 1968

REFERENCE : Memo for Support Office Heads fr SA/DDS dtd
8 May 68, same subject

1. In response to referent memorandum, we cannot report any unusual actions on the part of our headquarters Office of Personnel. We have had to rely on dispatch number [REDACTED] from the Acting COS, Vietnam for information about the services of our field personnel during the crisis. From that report, it does not appear that the Personnel element was called on to perform unusual tasks although they shared in the general effort of most Station personnel to be useful in whatever capacity they could.

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2. I will query [REDACTED] in further detail on this point when he returns to this country and will advise you if any significant new information is developed.


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[REDACTED]

Director of Personnel

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DD/S 68 256

17 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the DDS

SUBJECT : Actions Undertaken During TET
Offensive in Viet Nam - 30 January
to 15 February 1968

REFERENCE : Your Memoranda Dated 8 May 1968,
Same Subject

1. We have completed a review of our components in Headquarters and wish to report that we had two professional employees TDY in Viet Nam during the TET offensive. We have requested a written report from them at the earliest possible date, which will be submitted to you upon receipt.

2. We are attaching a copy of the Report of Activities (wo/att) prepared by the Chief of Security, Saigon Station, which gives the general overall coverage of the activities of Station elements during the TET offensive. This Report has also been referred to our two employees for any additional details that they may add as the result of their experiences.




Chief, Executive Staff
Office of Security

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Attachment

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[REDACTED]		MARKED FOR INDEXING 25X1
[REDACTED]		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
[REDACTED]		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
[REDACTED]		MICROFILM 25X1
Chief, Far East Division Chief of Station, Vietnam Administration - Report of Activities		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

Ref: [REDACTED]

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1. Forwarded herewith is the report of activities of the Saigon Security Office for the period 31 January through 29 February 1968. This covered the very important period of the VC Tet offensive, when all members of the Station were called upon to put in long hours, suffer many inconveniences, and face certain risks.

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2. I would like to take this opportunity of going on official record [REDACTED] that the Saigon Security Office has done what I consider to be an outstanding job in the face of many difficulties. The individual members have given unstintingly of their time and experience, and have been a credit to the Office. This applies to all members of the Security team, including the very competent secretaries; the hard working Contract Employees; the fine Career Security Officers; and the high quality Military Assignees.

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Attachments:

- 1 - Monthly Report (3 cys), h/w
- 2 - Photographs (59), usc
- 3 - Intelligence Reports (10) sc

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- 4 - Briefing Outlines (2), usc
- 5 - Station Bulletins, Nos. 22-68, 25-68, 42-68 (3), usc
- 6 - Station Directives, Nos. 10-12, 10-13 (2), usc

Distribution:

- 2 - [REDACTED] w/atts. #1, h/w and 2-8, usc ✓
- 1 - Chief, Regional, w/att. #1, h/w
- 1 - Chief, FE, wo/atts.

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	[REDACTED]	7 MAR 1968 5 March 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER

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MONTHLY REPORT FOR THE PERIOD
31 January through 29 February 1968

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I. VIET CONG TET ATTACK

1. Viet Cong forces launched a very heavy attack against Saigon and various Province capitals on Wednesday, 31 January 1968, and most of the efforts of the Security Branch have since been directed at assisting all Station elements during the emergency period; supporting our personnel in returning to normal operating procedures under somewhat difficult circumstances; improving our overall posture from a security standpoint; and planning future contingency actions in the event of another VC attack. This report on February activities will not follow the standard format, but will attempt to provide the [redacted] with insight as to the steps which were taken during the emergency period and also shed some light as to plans for the immediate future.

2. In the initial attack on the [redacted] installation, approximately twenty suspected Viet Cong were killed inside the compound before the area was listed as being secure, after a very heavy firefight. One member of the Security Branch assisted military guards in securing rooms of the Station complex during the early morning hours, when mop-up operations were still in effect. He later provided some assistance to the Station Duty Officer at a time when other individuals did not have access to the [redacted] area.

3. In the early morning hours of 31 January, when Saigon was still under intense pressure from the VC, arrangements were made to call in the eleven [redacted] assignees for general support requirements. In response to an emergency radio call for assistance one Security representative and three of the military assignees went to the residence of four Station members who were in an area hard hit by the VC attackers. Protection was provided for the following few days when important air support requirements were handled through the residence.

4. Two Security representatives succeeded in gaining access to Tan Son Nhut Air Base during the day on 31 January, when there remained considerable heavy arms and sniperfire, in order to recover large supplies of weapons, ammunition, flak jackets, and helmets. This material was later distributed on an expedite basis for the protection of Station personnel and installations.

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-2-

USAF

5. During the first week after the Tet offensive, Security representatives, accompanied by ~~USAF~~ assignees, made at least seven significant trips into relatively hazardous Saigon areas in order to recover personnel who were stranded or otherwise isolated from the Station. Two trips were made into a risky area near Tan Son Nhut ~~for~~ the purpose of picking up twelve whose services were considered particularly crucial during the emergency period.

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6. A Security Officer provided protection and security escort for the Chief of Station and several other senior officials on 31 January. A military assignee was later given these duties on an intermittent basis for the personal protection of the Chief of Station during the early crucial emergency period.

7. Since the initial VC strike on the ~~Embassy~~ ^{Embassy} complex, a two or four man team has been on special all night assignment to the Duty Officer, and they have proved invaluable as military escorts to the civilian members of the Station who have a need to be travelling on official business after the 1900 hours curfew. The assignment has now come to be somewhat routine in nature, but it was much more touch and go the first two weeks after the Tet offensive, when there were severe restrictions on movement caused by roving VC armed bands and snipers.

8. In the first ~~few~~ ^{State Dept} weeks after the attack on ~~Embassy~~ ^{Embassy} one Security Officer was working almost full time in close coordination with the ~~Security Officer~~ ^{Security Officer} in investigating details of the VC effort. Particular attention was being directed to indications that the attacking force may have been provided with assistance by local employees in the compound. There remains a keen Station interest in the outcome of this Security review.

9. As of 9 February, arrangements were made by the Security Branch for the acquisition of twelve ~~personnel~~ ^{personnel} and four military vehicles to provide increased mobility and security for Station elements while the VC threat remained. These men are armed with the formidable M-14 weapons and have made a significant contribution to the total security effort. When considered in conjunction with the high quality ~~assignees~~ ^{assignees}, there are now twenty-three members of the military acquired by and working under the supervision of the Chief, Security.

USAF

10. During the reporting period, the Security Branch provided heavy increased American protective coverage at key installations of the Station, with particular attention being directed at the Communications facilities, Logistics installations,

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and the Medical Office. The Security Branch was assigned a number of Staff Employees who assisted in covering these important areas.

II. EMERGENCY ALERT PERIOD

1. Since the beginning of the Tet offensive there has been continuing effort to "build in" improved security at the principal hotel/apartment buildings utilized by large segments of the Station without, however, generating undue alarm or otherwise disrupting normal operations of the Station. In a period when there remained some element of risk from sniper fire, we were endeavoring to push for a return to normal on office hours and general work procedures. Security representatives were assigned full time to our two main housing units in order to render advice, guidance, and assistance to Station employees.

2. As had been mentioned earlier, it was considered essential to expeditiously arm our personnel when there was a strong existing threat from the VC. The war came home to Saigon and never had a city changed more quickly. However, there were several minor accidents, and it became necessary to exercise increased control and discretion on the handling of weapons. Several Station notices were issued on this topic, and a cable was forwarded to Headquarters on the long term aspects of fire-arms training.

3. The Headquarters Survey Team completed six Province Security Surveys in IV Corps during the period 19 - 25 February, before being asked to return to Saigon for general security support duties because of an expected second phase attack from the VC. They did conduct some preliminary emergency surveys in the Saigon area in connection with the immediate threat, and will now resume their security reviews in III Corps.

4. [redacted] returned from [redacted] Vietnam, and turned in an excellent report in connection with the missing Station employee who is now considered to be a prisoner of the Viet Cong. Forwarded under separate cover will be some pictures of safes and office areas damaged by the VC during their extended presence [redacted] also visited [redacted] in III Corps and opened a safe damaged during the attack.

5. As of 22 February 1968, arrangements were completed

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-4-

ARMY
for the establishment of a highly flexible and useful Security Communications Net, which permits the Chief of Security to maintain ready contact with all members of the Branch, including *SAE* assignees. The Security Branch is now included in the *Embassy* communications net, and we are in a position to monitor the highly informative Military Police net, which provides tactical information on incidents in the Saigon area.

6. The Indigenous Investigative Unit has been utilized to good avail in conducting discreet local inquiries with a view towards determining the whereabouts of employees who have not returned to work following the Tet holiday attack. Many of the local employees resided in the dangerous Cholon - Gia Dinh areas and suffered heavily from the hands of the Viet Cong.

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8. There has been a regrouping of the Nung Guard Force, which is now operating fairly well after the first VC strike in Saigon and the provinces. In some quarters there has been extremely heavy praise for the performance of the Nungs, whereas in other areas, their actions were less than spectacular.

III. PLANNING STAGE

1. On the basis of the somewhat unsettled conditions in Vietnam, a Station Directive was issued on the destruction of classified material in an emergency. The intent and purpose of the Directive was to place renewed emphasis on the reduction of classified documents; arrange for the orderly screening and segregating of sensitive materials on the basis of a priority designating; and provide for the designation of destruction team members.

2. In midFebruary the Chief of Security attended a conference for the Regional Officers in Charge. This meeting

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offered an opportunity to review our security/communications experiences and problems generated as a result of the Viet Cong attacks, and covered such items as evacuation planning, emergency destruction, weapons familiarization, cover arrangements, safekeeping equipment, Nung Guards assigned to the provinces, and communications gear.

3. The Security Branch later provided the ROIC's with individual copies of COMUSMACV Operation Plan 60-67, which establishes the basic guidelines for the emergency evacuation of civilians from Saigon, Vietnam. The ROIC's were also furnished 100 copies of briefing outlines prepared by the Security Branch on Emergency and Evacuation Planning. This was intended primarily as a check-list for the Province Officers in preparing their own individual E & E plans.

4. On 27 February 1968, coordination was effected with the Chief of Logistics and the Chief of the Medical Branch in order to provide for the expeditious delivery of Conex boxes to key Saigon installations. There are reserve supplies of C rations, water, lamps, and medical supplies. On 28 February arrangements were made for the delivery of sodium nitrate drum destructor kits to the ~~compound~~ compound. additional emergency destructor kits have been ordered and special instructions have been provided the ROIC's on the construction of field expedient drum destructors.

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Embassy
5. In view of the possibility that we may be entering a decisive period in Vietnam, the Station is heavily involved in contingency planning. The Security Branch is making a solid contribution in this overall effort which encompasses the protection of our personnel, installations, and classified material. On 27 February the Chief of Security coordinated with the *Navy* for pertinent information on transportation to the designated Emergency Relocation Center in the event Saigon becomes untenable.

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SECRET157/5 68-3668
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13 JAN 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the Deputy Director
for Support

SUBJECT : Actions Undertaken During Tet Offensive in
Vietnam - 30 January to 15 February 1968

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, dated 8 May 1968, Same
Subject

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1. There is little that can be added to the comprehensive report filed by the Acting Chief of Station, Vietnam [redacted] which describes in detail the role played by the field representatives of the Agency's Support components, including OC, during the Tet Offensive. [redacted] did report a bit of supplemental information concerning the six hour attack on the Saigon Embassy. The only damage done to the Embassy Signal Center consisted of shrapnel from a B-40 rocket which hit an air-conditioner in the [redacted] area after exploding on the sun screen a few feet above it. Coupled with outage of this air-conditioner, the building air-conditioner was shut off each night during the fighting so that troops on the roof could hear sounds in the surrounding area. Consequently, the Signal Center had to rely on wall air-conditioners which fortunately proved to be sufficient to meet the requirement. Our antennas were untouched during the fighting.

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2. Although action was concentrated primarily in the field during this period, our Headquarters Asiatic Division immediately went on 24-hour emergency alert at the beginning of the offensive. The only major significant action at Headquarters was a response to an urgent field request for emergency voice equipment. Within a few days after receipt of the request, [redacted]

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3. From a historical standpoint, there were a few lessons learned. The sudden heavy fighting in Saigon demonstrated that we could not depend solely on only one major equipment repair

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[redacted] Diversified and dispersed repair facilities to handle both staff and operational repair requirements are being established. The country-wide offensive also proved the need for a larger amount of spare equipment to be kept in reserve in Saigon. Although [redacted] responded immediately to requests for parts or equipments, APO shipments were delayed about 10 days and MAC shipments were delayed about 20 days. Fortunately we were able to supply technicians in a more timely fashion. Thanks to the heliport on the Embassy, we were able to dispatch technicians immediately and directly to Vietnam field stations on five separate occasions. This crisis also proved the worth of our [redacted] Technicians. It was only through their efforts working night and day that we were able to meet the sudden demand for communications equipment.

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4. In summary, no major communications problem was encountered during the Tet Offensive. The three OC men on duty at the Embassy in Saigon during the attack turned in outstanding performances. Also OC members of the OC Saigon staff and the [redacted] complement likewise carried out many diverse tasks willingly and professionally under most difficult and dangerous conditions.

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[redacted]
Deputy Director of Communications

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25 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Office of Medical Services -- TET Offensive

 OMS says that OMS has nothing of interest to report on activities of medical personnel during the 30 January - 15 February Viet Cong offensive.

STAT


Special Assistant to the
Deputy Director for Support

STAT


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15 April 68



STAT

According to my record,

only OL has responded.

RBW's note to me on Friday
re this: "This was for
historical purposes, and I did
not understand that comments
should be sent to DD/S. Suggest
scrubbing. "

p.

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
DD/S 68-2348

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Communications
Director of Finance
Director of Medical Services
Director of Personnel
Director of Security -
Director of Training ✓

SUBJECT : Actions Undertaken During Tet Offensive in
Vietnam -- 30 January to 15 February 1968

1. You will recall that Mr. Coffey mentioned in the DD/S Staff Meeting of 19 March 1968 the Director's interest in assuring that the Agency does not lose the historical input resulting from actions performed by the various components, including acts of personnel heroism.

2. If you have completed the review of your functional components in the area during this period, the DD/S would like to have a copy of your review for his information.

15/

Special Assistant to the
Deputy Director for Support

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SA-DD/S:RBW:dlk (8 May 68)

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
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SECRET EYES ONLY

13 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 13 March 1968

E-X-T-R-A-C-T

"The Director commented that CIA's multifaceted performance during the Tet offensive, including acts of personal heroism, should be a matter of record and asked that the Deputies ensure the collection of Agency deeds during this period for collation and distillation when the first opportunity presents itself."

E-X-T-R-A-C-T

s/L. K. White

h/w by Mr. Bannerman:

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